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NOTES
UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, THEORETICAL BANG AND
PRACTICAL WHIMPER? AN ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS
BASED ON LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF THE CHILD
SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
"When parents separate, children may suffer. Their suffering
is... often made much worse through the deliberate failure of a
parent to comply with legally imposed child support obliga-
tions."' In the fall of 1992, Congress passed the Child Support
Recovery Act2 (the "Act" or CSRA) in an effort to end this suf-
1. Statement by President George Bush on Signing The Child Support Recovery
Act of 1992, 2 PUR. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: GEORGE BUSH 1978, 1978-79 (Oct.
25, 1992).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
§ 228. Failure to pay legal child support obligations
(a) OFFENSE.&-Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support
obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) PUNISMAENT.-The punishment for an offense under this sec-
tion is-
(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine under
this title, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for
not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) RESTITUTION.-Upon a conviction under this section, the court
shall order restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past
due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
(d) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section-
(1) the term "past due support obligation . means any amount-
(A) determined under a court order or an order of an -adminis-
trative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person
for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent
with whom the child is living, and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year,
or is greater than $5,000; and
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, and any
other possession or territory of the United States.
Id.
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fering of children and their custodial parents at the hands of
those who have become known as "deadbeat" parents.3 The Act
made willful failure by a noncustodial parent to pay child sup-
port for a child residing in another state a federal crime.4
In spite of good intentions5 and strong bipartisan support,'
the Department of Justice made only nominal enforcement ef-
forts until January of 1995,7 at which time enforcement began
3. The phrase "deadbeat dad" or "deadbeat parent" refers to a noncustodial par-
ent who is in arrears in child support payments. See Joseph I. Lieberman, Foreword
to ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT xviii (1993); Deadbeat Dad Prosecuted, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 17, 1995,
at B4; Jan Larson, Everyone Pays When Dad's a Deadbeat, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July
1992, at 39; 60 Minutes: Deadbeat Dad (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1995).
Eighty-six percent of noncustodial parents are fathers. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT SERIES 60-187, CHILD SUP-
PORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 1991, at 2 (1995) [hereinafter CHILD
SUPPORT 1991]. The term "deadbeat dad" first was popularized in the national media
in the early 1980s. See, e.g., Patricia A. Avery, On the Trail of Those Deadbeat
Dads, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 21, 1983, at 70; Anastasia Toufexis,.Color
Gloria Allred All Rebel, TIME, Dec. 3, 1984, at 67. Since that time, the connotation
of "deadbeat parent" has evolved to apply to those parents who are financially able,
but unwilling, to pay their child support obligations. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Delin-
quent Dads: When Child Support Lags, 'Deadbeats' May Go to Jail, WASH. POST,
Dec. 16, 1990, at Al (discussing fathers who choose not to pay child support despite
their financial resources).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a); Kitty Dumas, Several Bills to Help Children Top List
of Legal Measures, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3172, 3172 (1992).
5. Purposes of the CSRA are: to "punish[ ] .. . persons who intentionally fail to
pay their child support obligations," H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 4 (1992); to remedy
the tragic effects of the increase in single parent households, see id. at 5; to allevi-
ate reliance on the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, see
id.; to "tak[e] the incentive out of moving [between states] to avoid [child support]
payment," id. at 6; to "target . . . the 'hard core' group of parents who flagrantly
refuse to pay and whom traditional extradition procedures have utterly failed to
bring to justice," id.; and to place "the burden of caring for these children ... on
the shoulders of the parents-where it rightfully belongs." Id. Deterrence also was
considered to be a positive effect of the Act. See Criminal Penalty for Flight To
Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support: Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Rep. Schumer); see
also Support Law Ruled Unconstitutional, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS,
Oct. 31, 1995, at B14 (stating that the CSRA is well intentioned).
6. See 138 CONG. REc. S17,129-31 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kohl); 138 CONG. REC. H7324-25 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Schumer).
7. See 140 CONG. REC. S9425 (daily ed. July 21, 1994) (statement of Sen. Shelby)
(offering an amendment to spur CSRA enforcement by the Attorney General). As of
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in earnest in response to presidential interest and senatorial
pressure.8 Since January of 1995, 119 indictments have been
handed down against violators of the Act.'
Increased enforcement displeased delinquent parents indicted
under the Act and they quickly sought means by which to chal-
lenge their indictments. The deadbeats' hopes were fueled by
United States v. Lopez,0 then a Commerce Clause challenge
pending before the Supreme Court." The Court's decision in
Lopez, announced in April of 1995,2 threw a hurdle into the
path of full enforcement of the Act. As a result of Lopez, CSRA-
indicted parents quickly began to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act on the basis that it impermissibly overextended
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause." As
of this writing, several cases based on this claim have been de-
cided at the district and circuit court levels, yielding inconsistent
results.'4 Four district courts, when faced with the question of
July 1994, only five prosecutions had been instigated. See id. at S9430 (statement of
Sen. Kohl).
8. See id. at S9425 (statement of Sen. Shelby); The State of the Union: Clinton
Speech Envisions Local Empowerment, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 300, 302 (1995) (in-
dicating President Clinton's resolve to force deadbeat parents to pay child support).
9. See No Breaks for Deadbeats, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 1996, at 12A, available in
1996 WL 2066312. Nationwide, convictions have recovered $1 .million in overdue
child support. See Bruce Vielmetti, Deadbeats Getting Federal Attention, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at BI.
10. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
11. The parties argued before the Court in November of 1994. See Mark Tushnet,
Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 845, 845 n.2 (1996).
12. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
13. The first arguments on the issue of the constitutionality of the CSRA under
Lopez were heard on May 8, 1995. See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360,
1361 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder,
894 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787.
14. District courts in the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the
CSRA is an unconstitutional overextension of Congress's power. See United States v.
Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp.
727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1368; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp.
at 368-69. In contrast, district courts in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the statute. See United States v. Lewis,
936 F. Supp. 1093, 1109 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp.
1076, 1082-83 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 314-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (W.D.N.Y. 1996);
United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v.
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the constitutionality of the CSRA, determined that the Act was
an unconstitutional overextension of Congress's commerce power
under the Lopez analysis. 5 Two of those decisions have since
been overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 6 Elev-
en district courts reached the opposite conclusion and have up-
held the constitutionality of the Act. 7 Two of those decisions
have been affirmed in the circuit courts. 8 Another case was
vacated for improper venue by a district court on appeal from a
magistrate's initial ruling. 9 Though the circuits that have ad-
dressed the issue are in accord thus far,2" lower court treatment
of the constitutionality of the Act has been one of the few ques-
tions to split the courts since the Supreme Court handed down
Lopez.2' As the question of the Act's constitutionality has made
its way through the federal courts, the bench has taken the op-
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Sims, 936 F.
Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 92-93 (D.
Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F.
Supp. 389, 394 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 617
(W.D. Va. 1995), vacated for improper venue, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996);
United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995), afrd, 95 F.3d
999 (10th Cir. 1996).
15. See Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 843; Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730; Mussari, 894 F.
Supp. at 1368; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 368-69.
16. See Mussari, 95 F.3d at 791, rev'g Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, and rev'g
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360.
17. See Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1109; Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1082-83; Nichols,
28 F. Supp. at 314-15; Collins, 921 F. Supp. at 1037; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 915;
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1239; Sims, 936 F. Supp. at 820; Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 92-
93; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 394; Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 617; Hampshire, 892 F.
Supp. at 1330.
18. See Sage, 92 F.3d at 108, affg 906 F. Supp. 84; United States v. Hampshire,
95 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996), affg 892 F. Supp. 1327.
19. See Murphy v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 736, 740 (W.D. Va. 1996), vacating
for improper venue 893 F. Supp. 614.
20. See Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1003-04; Mussari, 95 F.3d at 791; Sage, 92 F.3d at 107.
21. Though numerous other statutes have been challenged, see infra note 96, only a
handful have been declared unconstitutional under Lopez. See, e.g., United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
(1994)); United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1522-32 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (ad-
dressing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 806-19 (W.D.N.C.
1996) (addressing the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248).
These enactments, however, were held to be unconstitutional only by one or two
courts, not four as was the CSRA. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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portunity to interpret the effect of Lopez on Congress's ability to
legislate broadly under the commerce power in order to cure na-
tionally recognized social ills.2"
This Note examines the analytical framework that lower
courts have applied to the question of the constitutionality of the
CSRA and proffers, based on this analysis, that the much her-
aded Lopez decision, though arguably a theoretical resurgence
of federalism, has had little practical effect in framing a new
paradigm in the lower courts. First, to provide background and
context for Lopez, this Note briefly reviews the history of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. The Note then examines the Lopez
holding and analyzes its potential impact on the future of Com-
merce Clause cases. Next, this Note applies the Lopez principles
to the CSRA and demonstrates why it is difficult to hold the Act
to be unconstitutional under that analysis. Finally, this Note
surveys the lessons learned from the lower courts' treatment to
offer practical suggestions for invigorating Lopez's reinvigoration
of federalism.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The United States Constitution created a government of enu-
merated powers." That is, certain functions have been delegat-
22. Courts will have similar opportunity to hear many other cases in which stat-
utes have been challenged as unconstitutional overextensions of Congress's commerce
power under the Lopez standard. See James Podgers, Rethinking the Commerce
Clause, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 44 (stating that Lopez has reopened the Commerce
Clause debate in the lower federal courts); see also infra note 96 (cataloguing the
myriad circuit court of appeals decisions ruling on thb constitutionality of various
federal statutes under Lopez).
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[Plowers delegated ... to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."); Unit-
ed States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 155 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 83 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 199, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819); Raoul Berger,
Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 696-99 (1996);
Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce
Power, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 901, 903 (1987); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerat-
ing Congress's powers); John G. Schmidt Jr., Note, The Tenth Amendment: A "New"
Limitation on Congressional Commerce Power, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 417, 420-27
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ed to the federal government explicitly and those functions that
have not been so assigned remain with the states through the
Tenth Amendment.' The Commerce Clause explicitly enumer-
ates a power that is assigned to the federal government rather
than to the states.' The Commerce Clause delegates to Con-
gress the "Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."26 Because the Commerce Clause provides the federal
government the ability to legislate in areas that otherwise would
be reserved for the states, it has served as the jurisprudential
backdrop for the federalism question throughout the nation's
history; i.e., the Clause has served as the boundary line of feder-
al government's sovereignty vis-A-vis the states." This segment
(1993) (discussing the tensions at the constitutional convention between the federal-
ists favoring a strong national government and the antifederalists favoring stronger
local governments, and that debate's relationship to enumerated powers).
24. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The Tenth Amendment is not considered to confer affirmative rights to the
states, but reserves the powers not delegated to the federal government for the
states:
The [Tenth) [A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained that
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption
to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution . . . or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that
the new national government might seek to exercise fully their reserved
powers.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also Schmidt, supra note 23,
at 420-21 (outlining the origins of the Tenth Amendment). But see Cirillo &
Eisenhofer, supra note 23, at 904 & n.20 (describing a competing view of the Tenth
Amendment).
The concept of dual sovereignty between the federal government and the states,
as represented by the concept of enumerated powers and the Tenth Amendment, is
the United States' unique contribution to governmental structure. See BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 228-29 (enlarged
ed. 1992).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-18 (enumerating
this and other congressional powers); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-3 (enumerating presiden-
tial powers); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (enumerating judicial powers).
26. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 66-67 (1937), quoted in
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 120 (1987); Richard S. Myers,
The Burger Court and the Commerce Clause: An Evaluation of the Role of State
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of the Note discusses the history of the debate over the appropri-
ate breadth of the federal legislative power as framed by the
Commerce Clause.
The Early Cases
The first Supreme Court case to address the Commerce
Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden,' has been interpreted as providing
the federal government with broad commerce power.' At issue
in the case was whether New York could enact a law providing
for exclusive steamship franchises for passage to New Jersey.0
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall defined commerce as "traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the com-
mercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
Sovereignty, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1985).
28. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
29. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). Much debate as to the actu-
al breadth that Chief Justice John Marshall intended to give the commerce power in
Gibbons has ensued. According to Professor Tribe:
Marshall indicated that, in his view, congressional power to regulate
"commercial intercourse" extended to all activity having any interstate
impact-however indirect. Acting under the commerce clause, Congress
could legislate with respect to all "commerce which concerns more states
than one." This power would be plenary- absolute within its sphere, sub-
ject only to the Constitution's affirmative prohibitions on the exercise of
federal authority.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4 (1978) (footnotes omit-
ted). Professor Tribe and those who agree with his view of Gibbons believe that the
decision provides an historical basis for the broad powers given to Congress under
the authority of the Commerce Clause in the 20th century. See Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1399400 & n.32
(1987) (recognizing that many scholars embrace views similar to those of Professor
Tribe).
Professor Epstein, however, disagreed with Tribe's analysis of Gibbons. Epstein
stated that the breadth of commerce intimated by Marshall is broader than the lim.
ited area of the "boundary between the two states" but narrower than Tribe be-
lieved, and asserted that the Chief Justice's intent was to designate that the nature
of the transaction rather than the strict geographical location of the transaction was
the proper way to characterize what fell within Congress's commerce power. See U
at 1403. According to Epstein, "Marshall well understood the fact that local events
affected interstate commerce, but he rejected it as a basis, for extension of congres-
sional power over internal matters." Id. at 1407. In Epstein's view,, the scope of the
modern commerce power has expanded well beyond that which Chief Justice Mar-
shall envisioned. See id at 1399-408.
30. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-3.
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its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying
on that intercourse."31 Marshall considered the commerce power
to be "complete in itself," limited only by its constitutional pa-
rameters. 2
After Gibbons, the question of the scope of Congress's Com-
merce Clause-based authority did not return to the Court's at-
tention for fifty years.33 When the Commerce Clause did return
to the Court's docket, the resulting rulings did not give Congress
the plenary power that many have credited Gibbons with provid-
ing.34 Rather, the Court read the Commerce Clause to constrain
legislators within narrow parameters to prevent laws that in-
truded into intrastate activities.35
Between 1824 and 1937,6 the Supreme Court placed
Congress's power to legislate on the basis of the commerce power
within rigid boundaries. 37 Congress could pass laws regulating
commerce but could not regulate manufacturing.8 It could reg-
31. Id. at 189-90.
32. See id. at 196.
33. See James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Con-
stitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1795, 1805 n.63 (1994) (stating that the Commerce Clause did not return to
the Court's attention for 50 years after Gibbons); see also United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995) (indicating that there was a period in which the Court
heard no Commerce Clause cases).
34. For a discussion of two views of the actual breadth of the commerce power
provided by Gibbons see supra note 29. See also Epstein, supra note 29, at 1442
(stating that post-New Deal cases diverged from Chief Justice Marshall's intent in
Gibbons); Debra L. Farmer, Recent Developments, United States v. Lopez: The Fifth
Circuit Declares the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 an Unconstitutional Exten-
sion of Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 68 TuL. L. REV. 1674,
1677 (1994) (summarizing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Lopez).
35. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L.
REV. 799, 857 & n.255 (1995); Farmer, supra note 34, at 1677; cf Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1628 (recognizing the constraints on Commerce Clause power before 1937).
36. This time period encompassed the years between the decisions in Gibbons and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For discussion of Jones &
Laughlin, see infra notes 44 & 90.
37. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942);
Farmer, supra note 34, at 1677.
38. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (the "Child Labor Cases") (invalidating child
labor legislation on the grounds that Congress was regulating manufacturing); Unit-
ed States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to manu-
684 [Vol. 38:677
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ulate both the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 39 and
goods travelling in interstate commerce." Finally, Congress
had the power to regulate activities that had a direct effect upon
interstate commerce but not those activities with an indirect ef-
fect.4 ' These distinctions existed to differentiate local intrastate
commerce from national interstate commerce and to ensure that
congressional regulation affected only commerce having an inter-
state component.42
The New Deal Expansion
The election of President Franklin Roosevelt and the develop-
ment of the New Deal federal economic policies had an immea-
surable impact on the development of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence.43 The narrow boundaries that had been established
facture, and is not a part of it."); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1888) (holding
that manufacturing is a matter of local concern and therefore beyond the scope of
the commerce power); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract
Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Fail-
ure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 260 n.8; Farmer, supra note 34,
at 1677.
39. See Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 257 U.S. 563,
590-91 (1922) (upholding the Transportation Act of 1920); Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914) (the "Shreveport Rate Case") (allowing
the Interstate Commerce Commission to set maximum rates for interstate train traf-
fic); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1911) (upholding the
Safety Appliance Act of Mar. 2, 1893); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 566
(1870) (upholding a steamship license and inspection statute).
40. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (allowing prohibition of
interstate transportation of impure women); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (allowing prohibition of interstate shipment of impure food); Lot-
tery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (allowing prohibition of interstate shipment of
lottery tickets); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890) (allowing regulation of
interstate transportation of intoxicating beverages).
41. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 378 (1905); E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.
42. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 23, at 910-12; Farmer, supra note 34, at
1677.
43. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 23, at 912; Richard A. Epstein, Constitu-
tional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 183 (1996)
[hereinafter Epstein, Constitutional Faith]; Epstein, supra note 29, at 1443-47;
Stempel, supra note 38, at 260 n.8.; Farmer, supra note 34, at 1677; James A.
Frechter, Note, Alien Landownership in the United States: A Matter of State Control,
14 BROOK. J. INTL L. 147, 161 n.103 (1988); David S. Gehrig, Note, The Gun-Free
School Zones Act: The Shootout over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and
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for permissible regulation of commerce expanded tremendously;
what remained was a reading of the Commerce Clause that al-
lowed Congress to regulate extensively in economic areas." By
Federalism, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179, 184 (1994); Patricia S. Henry, Comment,
Constitutional Limitation of Congressional Commerce Clause Power, 58 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 109, 114 (1982); Maloney, supra note 33, at 1806-08; cf Stephen Chippendale,
Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN.
L. REV. 455, 460 n.28 (1994) (noting the importance of the New Deal); Schmidt,
supra note 23, at 427-29 (noting that, by 1994, the Supreme Court had found uncon-
stitutional only one commerce-based statute). But see Barry Cushman, A Stream of
Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones &
Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 105-06 (1992) (doubting the significance of New
Deal politics on jurisprudential consistency).
The Supreme Court initially struck down the New Deal legislation as an uncon-
stitutional overexpansion of the federal power into the individual's economic rights.
See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 279 (1989).
Out of frustration with the Court's reluctance to uphold the sweeping economic re-
form embodied in the New Deal, President Roosevelt proposed a court-packing plan,
which called for the appointment of additional judges in all federal courts where
incumbent judges were age 70 or older. See id. at 282. Due to the ages of the Jus-
tices this would have increased the size of the Supreme Court substantially. See id.
After Roosevelt announced this plan, two justices became consistently more liberal,
and New Deal measures were upheld. See id.; Berger, supra note 23, at 713. he
story of the Court's change of doctrine usually resolves down to the 'switch in time
that saved nine' that was coincident with, though probably not motivated by,
Roosevelt's court-packing plan." Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Note, The New Deal Court:
Emergence of a New Reason, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1979 n.31 (1990).
"At the same time that the Court was jettisoning its concern with economic
rights and government regulation, it announced clearly its intentions to take on new
issues involving matters of human freedom." HALL, supra, at 313. For example, in
1937 the Court began to incorporate the Bill of Rights, which applied textually only
to the federal government, to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
These simultaneous doctrinal changes have resulted in the expansive role that the
federal government has taken on in both economic regulation and individual rights
in the latter half of the 20th century. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 655-95 (2d ed. 1985); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624, 1652 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that government regulation has
expanded since the New Deal).
44. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that Congress
has the power to regulate via the Commerce Clause activities that, in their individ-
ual capacity, have a trivial effect on interstate commerce, but in the aggregate have
a substantial effect); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125
(1942) (holding that commerce power can be exercised to regulate intrastate activi-
ties with substantial effects on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 116-17, 124-25 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), and upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1937) (abandoning the distinction between
manufacturing and commerce as a boundary for Commerce Clause legislation).
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1942, the strict prohibition against Congress's regulation of in-
trastate commerce had eased considerably.45 The Supreme
Court, through a series of decisions that recognized the inter-
state effects of local economic events, granted Congress the pow-
er to regulate incidences of intrastate commerce that, in the ag-
gregate, substantially affected interstate commerce.46
Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Commerce Clause jurisprudence expanded once again during
the Civil Rights Era.' In the 1960s, Congress used its com-
merce power to enact laws that were social policies, not econom-
ic regulations. 48 For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prevents discrimination in places of public accom-
modation, was an exercise of Congress's commerce power.49
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1964, Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States' and Katzenbach v.
McClung,"' upheld the Civil Rights Act.52 These decisions
clearly reiterated both the substantial effects test and a stan-
dard of rational basis review for Commerce Clause-based legisla-
tion.53 The Court, in later decisions, further clarified the
breadth of Congress's commerce power, but the power has yet to
be broadened further.'
Between 1964 and 1994, the Court held that a congressional
45. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119.
46. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29; Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119, 125;
Darby, 312 U.S. at 123; Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31.
47. See Gehrig, supra note 43, at 185-87; Maloney, supra note 33, at 1813.
48. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 23, at 913-14; Maloney, supra note 33, at 1813.
49. See Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determin-
ing the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of
the Constitution, 33 WML & MARY L. REV. 543, 572 n.169 (1992); David Michael
McConnell, Comment, Title VII at Twenty-The Unsettled Dilemma of 'Reverse" Dis-
crimination, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073, 1076 n.18 (1983); Maloney, supra note
33, at 1813 n.124.
50. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
51. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
52. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302-04.
53. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302-04.
54. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-54 (1971) (basing its holding
that a loan-sharking statute was constitutional on Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Katzenbach); Farmer, supra note 34, at 1680-81.
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act had exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause only once,
and that case was overruled within ten years.55 Cases were de-
cided so consistently in favor of expansive congressional com-
merce power that commentators often considered any legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause to be per se constitution-
al.56 The Commerce Clause developed into the basis for a virtu-
ally unlimited congressional police power because any local ac-
tivity, if considered in the aggregate, potentially could affect
interstate commerce.57 Nothing seemed beyond Congress's
reach until the Court handed down Lopez.
LOPEZ: THE HOLDING
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez shat-
tered the Commerce Clause's jurisprudential status quo. 8
Alphonso Lopez was convicted in the Western District of Texas
for violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal
criminal statute making it unlawful to possess a firearm within
one thousand feet of a school.59 On appeal of Lopez's conviction,
55. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (holding that
it was an unconstitutional overextension of Congress's commerce power to regulate
states' traditional governmental functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (eliminating the "traditional government
function" analysis).
56. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161 (2d ed. 1983) ("The Su-
preme Court today interprets the commerce cause [sic] as a complete grant of pow-
er."); Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 23, at 912-13; Rachel J. Littman, Comment,
Gun-Free Schools: Constitutional Powers, Limitations, and Social Policy Concerns
Surrounding Federal Regulation of Firearms in School, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
723, 746-47 (1995).
57. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (describing the breadth of Congress's commerce
power).
58. See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 864; Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to
Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIEs, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al; David Savage,
The Supreme Court Goes Back to Work, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 62; David 0. Stew-
art, Back to the Commerce Clause, A.B. J., July 1995, at 46 ("Lopez resembled a
constitutional Walpurgisnacht, setting loose precedents that long ago had been con-
signed to the flames of the auto-da-fd for discredited cases.").
59. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990). The statute
made it "unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that




the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, due to the total
absence of congressional findings on the issue of the statute's
nexus to interstate commerce and the court's inability to locate
any reference to a commercial effect in the legislative history,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was an unconstitutional
overextension of Congress's legislative power.60 In a similar
case, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act was constitutional.6'
At this point, the issue was ripe for Supreme Court review.62
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 was not a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power."
After reviewing the historical development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
used extant Commerce Clause precedents to promulgate a three-
part test to determine whether a Commerce Clause-based regu-
lation was constitutional." The test defines the categories of ac-
tivities that Congress is empowered to regulate under the au-
thority of the Commerce Clause.' First, the Court held that
"Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce."66 Second, the Court stated that "Congress is em-
powered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activi-
ties." 7 Finally, the Court recognized Congress's ability to regu-
late activities that have a "substantial relation" to or that "sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce."68
60. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366-68.
61. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 1819 (1995).
62. See William Banks, At the Halfway Point, A.BA J., Apr. 1995, at 50 (stating
that circuit splits most often lead to grants of certiorari).
63. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
64. See id. at 1626-30.
65. See id. at 1629-30.
66. Id. at 1629 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
256 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
67. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Houston E. & W.
Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
68. Id. at 1629-30 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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The Court then proceeded to apply the "substantial effect" test
to the Gun-Free School Zones Act.69 The Act did not fare well
under this analysis." Initially, the Court contrasted the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, which it characterized as having no con-
nection to interstate commerce, with other regulations that had
been upheld due to their subjects' substantial impacts on inter-
state commerce. 1 The Court showed that the other regulations
had a clear or direct nexus to economic activity that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act lacked.72
The Chief Justice's analysis also compared the Gun-Free
School Zones Act to another federal criminal statute that ad-
dressed gun possession and that survived Commerce Clause
challenges. 3 The other gun-possession measure had been saved
by an interstate jurisdictional requirement, i.e., a requirement
that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce. 4 This was
not a required element of the offense set forth in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act.75 Clearly, such a jurisdictional element could
have saved the legislation.76
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of legislative find-
ings.7  Though holding that, as a general rule, legislative find-
ings were not necessary for legislation to survive a Commerce
Clause-based challenge, such findings were necessary in the case
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the commerce connec-
tion was not "visible to the naked eye."78 Further, the Justices
decided that congressional findings regarding the interstate
nexus of past gun possession measures were insufficient to save
the Gun-Free School Zones Act because those past findings did
69. See id. at 1630.
70. See id. at 1630-33.
71. See id. at 1630-31.
72. See id. (comparing the statute in question in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994),
to the one examined in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), "the most far
reaching" of the Commerce Clause precedents, and finding that the wheat regulation
in Wickard clearly related to economic markets and pricing, whereas 18 U.S.C. §
922(q) had no such relation).








not adequately clarify the specific relationship between posses-
sion of a gun within a school zone and interstate commerce.79
Next, the Court turned away from facial analysis of the stat-
ute and examined the arguments that the government proffered
to illustrate the actual, substantial effect that the conduct regu-
lated by the statute had on interstate commerce." The govern-
ment argued that gun possession in a school zone contributes to
violence in the community and affects interstate commerce in
three ways: ' by increasing insurance rates, by dissuading indi-
viduals from travelling in an area, and by negatively affecting
the learning process of students in the school and thereby lead-
ing to a less educated and less productive citizenry." The Court
did not question that the cited effects had a connection to the
national economy; nevertheless, it rejected the government's ar-
gument due to the attenuated nature of the effects." The Court
concluded that if it accepted such an attenuated nexus to inter-
state commerce in upholding a Commerce Clause-based regula-
tion, Congress's commerce power would become limitless and, in
today's global economy, could lead to federal regulation of every
aspect of daily life." Chief Justice Rehnquist considered such a
boundless reading of legislative authority under the Commerce
Clause to be an impermissible intrusion on state sovereignty."
By the end of the majority opinion, the Gun-Free School Zones
Act had failed every portion of the Court's analysis." The Act
had no clear link to commercial activity, no jurisdictional nexus
to interstate commerce, and no findings or legislative history
regarding interstate commerce. Additionally, the government's
arguments illustrating the statute's substantial relationship to
79. See id. at 1632-33.
80. See id.
81. See i&.; see also Brief for the United States at 17-25, Lopez (No. 93-1260)
(outlining the government's arguments that the Gun-Free School Zones Act substan-
tially affected interstate commerce).
82. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33; see also Brief for the United States at 17-25,
Lopez (No. 93-1260) (stating the government's arguments that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act substantially affected interstate commerce).
83. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
84. See id. at 1632-34.
85. See id. at 1632.
86. See id. at 1630-34.
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interstate commerce were too attenuated. As a result of all of
the aforementioned shortcomings, the Chief Justice concluded
that the statute could not be found constitutional without fur-
ther expanding the scope of Congress's commerce power, a step
that the majority was unwilling to take." The Court therefore
struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision regarding its unconstitutionality.89
LOPEZ: THE EFFECTS
The actual effects of Lopez on the future of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence will remain a mystery until the Court grants cer-
tiorari to another case and has the opportunity to clarify its hold-
ing through analysis of another legislative enactment. The Lopez
holding leads to the anomalous conclusion that the "Constitution-
al Revolution" is over, but that the status quo still may be in-
tact;9" i.e., the outward expansion of the commerce power that
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1634.
89. See id.
90. The Constitutional Revolution is considered to be the convergence and simulta-
neous expansion of Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause with
the expansion of the protection of individual liberty under substantive due process
analysis, which began in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), and several other cases decided in the Court's October Term of 1936. See
EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 65-79 (1941) ("[Ihe remark-
able reversal of the Court's attitude toward the New Deal early in 1937 [is] the
event which comprises the more dramatic phase of the Constitutional Revolu-
tion . . . ."); Berger, supra note 23, at 713.
Arguably, the cessation of the outward expansion of rights under substantive
due process and equal protection began with the Burger Court. See Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not protect homosexual relations); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 442-47 (1985) (holding that mentally retarded adults are not a suspect class for
equal protection analysis and indicating the Court's reticence to establish additional
suspect classes). The Rehnquist Court has continued to limit the Fourteenth
Amendment's reach. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 872-73 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., plurality opinion), which supplanted the absolute
right of women to obtain abortions within the first trimester of pregnancy with the
right of the state to regulate abortions within the first trimester, illustrates this
principle. Clearly, Casey was an actual rescission of the right of privacy expounded
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973), which held that the right to an abortion
in the first trimester was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See id. Further, in recent Fourteenth Amendment cases, the Court has been
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began with the Constitutional Revolution during the New Deal
perhaps has ended, but, as a practical matter, the end of the revo-
lution does not have any rescissionary impact on congressional
power because the Commerce Clause analysis has not changed
substantially.9 So, though theoretically Lopez may mark a ma-
reluctant to allow broad-based affirmative action programs without a specific reme-
dial goal. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995)
(holding that even beneficial race classifications must be tied to specific past wrongs
by the state). If the revolution was an outward expansion of rights, then that out-
ward expansion apparently has halted, at least within the realm of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Lopez decision may have begun to do for the Commerce Clause what the
Rehnquist and Burger Courts already have done for the Fourteenth Amendment:
define the outer boundary of the expansion begun during the New Deal. Cf
Tushnet, supra note 11, at 866 (noting that Lopez and Adarand, when taken
"[t]ogether[,] . .. repudiate both the broad understanding[ ] of the post-New Deal
constitutional synthesis, in which national government was required to act, and a
narrower understanding in which it was permitted to act"). Seminole Tribe of Flori-
da v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), a recent Eleventh Amendment case, also illus-
trates that the Rehnquist Court is placing limitations on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 1133 (holding that the Commerce Clause does not
grant Congress sufficient powers to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suits in federal court).
Therefore, if one considers the Constitutional Revolution to have begun with the
simultaneous expansion of both the federal government's power to regulate extensive-
ly under the Commerce Clause and the scope of individual liberty protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Rehnquist Court in Lopez and Seminole Tribe per-
haps has ended the revolution by consistently defining the outer boundaries of the
federalism prong of the revolutionary expansion.
91. Lopez, because it relies heavily on the "revolutionary" precedents of the late
1930s and the 1940s, does not indicate a rescissionary effect as did Casey in the
abortion realm. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628; United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675,
685 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 46 (1996); Suzanna Sherry, The Barking
Dog, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 877, 877, 881-83 (1996). Instead, Lopez indicates that
the Commerce Clause will retain its current breadth. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685
("[The Supreme Court] did not intend Lopez to be a departure from established
Commerce Clause precedent."); Louis H. Pollak, Symposium, Foreword, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 533, 550 (1995) (stating that Lopez is not "epochal"). The Lopez holding, howev-
er, has invigorated Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Podgers, supra note 22, at
44; Pollak, supra, at 551 & n.96 (describing litigation producing disagreements
among the lower federal courts). An outer boundary of Congress's commerce power is
now within contemplation if not clear view. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685 ("Lopez is
primarily significant because it helps define the line between what Congress may
regulate and what it may not.").
One aspect of the Rehnquist Court's legacy may be to define the outer boundary
fully. Activity in the lower courts indicates that the Supreme Court will have many
opportunities to define that boundary if it chooses. See Pollak, supra, at 551 & n.96;
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jor turning point in legal history, it will have little measurable
effect on federalism in the purely pragmatic and operative senses,
except in reiterating that an outer boundary exists.
In Lopez, the Court stated with clarity its unwillingness to ex-
pand any further the bounds of the commerce power, because
doing so would create a congressional police power:
[Past decisions have] suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do
so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enu-
meration of powers does not presuppose something not enu-
merated... and that there will never be a distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local.... This
we are unwilling to do.'
It follows that, as the Court has stated its unwillingness to ex-
pand congressional authority over that which is "truly local," the
Court did not believe that the three-part test promulgated in the
decision allowed the national government to intrude on local
prerogatives.93
infra note 96. Challenges have arisen in the circuit courts of appeals questioning the
validity of a federal criminal statute under Lopez. See, e.g., United States v. Carvell,
74 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Malone, 70 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision); United States v. Edmonds, 69 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir.
1995); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kirk, 70
F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995); Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1566 (1996); United States v. Hinton, 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir.
1995) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1026 (1996); United States
v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United
States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995); United
States v. Pappadopoulos, 64. F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 59
F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 547 (1995); United States v. Dodge, 61
F.3d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 428 (1995).
At this stage, however, the conclusion must be that the revolution begun during
the New Deal may have run its course, but within the Commerce Clause arena the
status quo has not changed significantly. See Tushnet, supra note 10, at 850 (dis-
cussing Lopez in the framework of Professor Ackerman's theory of constitutional mo-
ments and concluding that the Lopez decision is "one item in the transformation
process"). To change the breadth of the power granted by the Commerce Clause sub-
stantially, as a practical matter, would be extremely difficult because so many gov-
ernment functions rest squarely on that legislative justification. See supra notes 47-
57 and accompanying text. The potential for the mass invalidation of legislation is
not an appealing prospect. See Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note 43, at 189-
90 (discussing the challenge of reevaluating the status quo in this area).
92. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (citations omitted).
93. For a discussion of the three-part test promulgated in Lopez, see supra notes
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The Court derived Lopez's three-part test, particularly the
"substantial effect" prong, from cases that represent the pinna-
cles of Commerce Clause breadth." Thus, despite the Court's
stated desire to stop the New Deal-based expansion of the com-
merce power, reliance on these cases indicates that no rescission
of the current congressional commerce power should occur as a
result of Lopez.95 Because congressional power has not been re-
scinded, the status quo essentially remains intact."
64-68 and accompanying text. But see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (stating the need to reconsider the "substantial effects" test in light of the
text and history of the Commerce Clause).
94. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 150 (1971); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 114 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
See supra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expansion of the
breadth of the commerce power after the New Deal.
The substantial effects prong, in particular, relied on cases standing for the in-
creased breadth of the Commerce Clause. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing
Perez, 402 U.S. at 146; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
95. The cited cases are valid, post-New Deal precedents that gave Congress broad
commerce power. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. In contrast, the Court could have
relied on the pre-New Deal cases that constrained Congress. See supra notes 28-42
and accompanying text (discussing pre-New Deal constraints). Reliance on the older
cases would have indicated rescission of the breadth of the commerce power as de-
veloped after the New Deal.
96. The vast majority of cases that have addressed the constitutionality of a par-
ticular statute under Lopez have held that the challenged statute was constitutional.
See United States v. Garcia, 94. F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
922(g), which prohibits the possession of firearms by a convicted felon); United
States v. Zorilla, 93 F.3d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), a fed-
eral drug trafficking statute); United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1452 (6th Cir.
1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which criminalizes illegal gambling businesses);
United States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g));
United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
922(o), which prohibits the possession or transfer of a machine gun); United States
v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. 922(o)); United
States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1397-99 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
371, which prohibits conspiracy to commit arson, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i));
United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §
860(a), which enhances the sentencing penalty for distributing drugs within 1000
feet of a school); United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318, 320-21 (8th Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibits the use of firearms in connection with
drug trafficking); United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 583-85 (1st Cir. 1996)
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Rational Basis Review?
Lopez does raise a question as to the continued vitality and
appropriateness of rational basis review of Commerce Clause
questions. 7 Until Lopez, rational basis was firmly ensconced as
the standard for evaluating whether a congressional enactment
was a valid exercise of the commerce power.9" In Lopez, the
Court did not ask whether Congress had a rational basis to be-
lieve that the Gun-Free School Zones Act substantially affected
(upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which prohibits the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of controlled substance), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 694 (1997); United States
v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which
prohibits interfering with commerce by committing robbery), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
966 (1996); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which criminalizes arson), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996);
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir.) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119,
which criminalizes carjacking), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995); United States v.
Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
which deals with illegal possession or transfer of firearms or ammunition); United
States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (uphold-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which criminalizes carjacking, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which
prohibits carrying a firearm during a crime of violence); United States v. Dodge, 61
F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir.) (upholding 26 U.S.C. § 5801, which prohibits possession of
an unregistered destructive device, and 18 U.S.C. § 371, which criminalizes a con-
spiracy to possess an unregistered firearm), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 428 (1995); Unit-
ed States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
922(o), which defines illegal posession or transfer of handguns); Cheffer v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 248, known as the Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); see also Wall, 92 F.3d at 1447-49 & nn.7-11
(discussing application of Lopez by lower federal courts overwhelmingly to uphold
federal statutes). But see United States v. Pappadopoulous, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the destruction of a personal residence did not substantially
affect interstate commerce merely because of the residence's connection to the utili-
ties lines).
97. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-33 (mentioning only briefly that the traditional
standard of review for Commerce Clause-based legislation has been rational basis
and applying a test to the Gun-Free School Zones Act without asking whether Con-
gress had a rational basis for finding that the activity regulated by the statute had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra
note 43, at 177, 189 (asserting that Lopez represents a return to intermediate scruti-
ny); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 682-85 (1995).
98. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-280 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
155-56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlan-
ta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964)); Epstein, Constitutional
Faith, supra note 43, at 182.
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interstate commerce; it asked whether the actual effects on in-
terstate commerce were substantial.99
The Gun-Free School Zones Act's lack of legislative findings or
history regarding the interstate commerce nexus complicates the
inquiry as to whether rational basis review has survived
Lopez.' Sufficient indicia in the opinion point out that, had
there been findings or history, the statute would have been up-
held.'' These indicia lead to the conclusion that rational basis
review may yet be alive and well in the presence of legislative
findings. °2
99. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-33. One may construe the Lopez opinion as hav-
ing subsumed the rational basis standard into the three-part Commerce Clause anal-
ysis, thus eliminating the separate application of a rational basis test and instead
inquiring only whether the activity fell within the three designated areas: channels
of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of or objects in interstate commerce, or
things having a substantial effect upon or relation to interstate commerce. See id. at
1629 (stating first that the Court had applied a rational basis test, then stating that
even under a rational basis standard the commerce power was limited by federalism
concerns, and finally pronouncing that "fc]onsistent with this structure, we have
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power"). If, after an independent assessment by the Court, the regulated
activity were found to fall within one of the three categories, there would be a pre-
sumption of validity under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 1629-33.
Such a scheme necessarily would heighten the scrutiny under the substantial
effects prong of the Lopez analysis. Rather than inquiring whether Congress had a
rational basis to believe that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate
commerce, see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 272-80; Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-56; Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 299-301; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53, courts would ask a
different question, a question of fact. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-33. A substantial
effect would exist only if the challenged statute empirically had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Congress's belief would be irrelevant. See id.
The investigation undertaken in the Lopez decision is consistent with this read-
ing in that the government's arguments regarding the substantial effect of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act were not accepted at face value as they generally would have
been under a traditional rational basis review. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 164-68 (5th ed. 1995). The Court evaluated the
strength of the arguments and examined the closeness of the connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. If, howev-
er, the Court's intention was to eliminate the rational basis and instead indepen-
dently investigate whether the enactment fell within three acceptable areas of con-
gressional regulation, that intention was not made clear. See id. at 1629-30.
100. See Merritt, supra note 97, at 693-94.
101. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (indicating that findings could clarify the
application of the substantial effect test).
102. See id.; see also United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 679-80, 688-89 (7th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 46 (1996) (stating that a rational basis test should be
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The Court's treatment of the government's arguments regard-
ing the connection that the Gun-Free School Zones Act bore to
interstate commerce may indicate that, in the absence of legisla-
tive findings or history, rational basis review no longer ap-
plies.0 3 The traditional deferential rational basis question:
Could Congress have concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act substantially affected interstate commerce?, seems to be an-
swered affirmatively by the government's arguments regarding
the effects of violence."" The Gun-Free School Zones Act did
not survive scrutiny, however, and the Court did not use the
language typical of rational basis review in making that deter-
mination, i.e., that the government's arguments had no rational
relationship to interstate commerce.0 5 In the end, it is unclear
whether the Court applied heightened scrutiny to these argu-
ments and disposed of them because of an empirical inadequacy,
or whether the Court disposed of the arguments because it found
them to be irrational.0 6
The possibility of a disjunction in the Court's view of the ap-
plicability of rational basis review in the presence or absence of
legislative findings and history may lead to separate tests: a
deferential, rational basis test when findings or history are pres-
ent, and a heightened, "actual effects" test when they are absent."
applied in the presence of findings, and upholding 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994), the Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act under a rational basis test). Rational basis
would be the standard if the stated substantial effect were accepted without further
inquiry. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 99, at 164-68.
103. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-33 (lacking any meaningful reference to rational
basis review). Rational basis review is a deferential standard under which courts
usually accept congressional assertions at face value without further inquiry into
actual reasoning or purpose. Cf NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 99, at 164-68 (illus-
trating the Court's deference).
104. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (explaining the government's view of the con-
gressional intent); Brief for Petitioner at 12-19, Lopez (No. 93-1260); Reply Brief for
the United States at 11-13, Lopez (No. 93-1260).
105. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-34 (lacking any reference to rationality or ratio-
nal basis review in applying the substantial effects analysis to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act).
106. See id.
107. This interpretation could prove to be a sensible approach. In the presence of
legislative findings and/or history, Congress's reasoning is clear and represented on
the face of the enactment or in the record of the legislative process. In such a case,
no need exists to second-guess the reasoning used in formulating the law. Without
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Lopez: A Failure?
Many questions remain in the wake of Lopez, though perhaps
these questions will be resolved if the Court grants certiorari to
one of the many Commerce Clause-based challenges to federal
statutes making their way through the federal courts. What the
Court meant to accomplish in the Lopez decision remains a ques-
tion. The case may stand as a judicial slap on the wrist for con-
gressional overreaching: enacting legislation that is not mindful
of either Congress's own enumerated powers or states'
rights."8 The Gun-Free School Zones Act, however, exemplified
such a record, however, further investigation by a reviewing court is necessary to
establish congressional intent. If during this investigation no clear basis for the en-
actment is forthcoming, the determination of the rational basis for the enactment is
left to a court's ingenuity and ability to conceive of a rational interstate commerce
nexus addressed by the statute. For a court then to evaluate whether its version of
the interstate commerce connection is substantial is a flawed exercise. It is neither a
true evaluation of the congressional intent upon enactment of the statute nor a true
evaluation of the substantial effect that the legislation actually has on interstate
commerce. Evaluating the actual, substantial effects of the statute produces a much
more direct conclusion regarding the validity of Congress's action. Further, because-
the court would not be contradicting a direct finding by Congress, interbranch har-
mony would not be implicated, as it would be were the reviewing court to question
the rationality of congressional findings directly.
Whether the evaluation bears the label "rational basis" may, in practical terms,
be a de minimis distinction because the rational basis test has been applied incon-
sistently. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (discussing varying applica-
tions of rational basis review in the equal protection context).
108. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (stating the proposition that the
statute could have survived with the presence of findings or history related to com-
merce). Another argument suggests that the Court intended to signal Congress to
check the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction. See generally Charles B.
Schweitzer, Comment, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce and the Federal Docket: The
Impact of U.S. v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 71 (1995) (suggesting that the crisis of
federal criminal jurisdiction was the primary motivator for the Lopez decision). Chief
Justice Relnquist has been particularly vocal on the issue of burgeoning federal
dockets. See William H. Rehnquist, Address, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of
the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1; 140 CONG. REC. S6090 (daily ed. May 19,
1994) (statement of Sen. Biden containing the letter of William H. Relnquist) (op-
posing federal jurisdiction over offenses traditionally reserved for the states in his
capacity as Presiding Officer of the Judicial Conference of the United States). In
fact, the Judicial Conference opposed the CSRA at the time of its passage on the
grounds that it would overtax the federal courts. See Vielmetti, supra note 9, at lB.
A full discussion of the issues surrounding federalization of crime and the re-
sulting burdens placed upon the federal court system is beyond the scope of this
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incredibly sloppy drafting."9 So, though Lopez has pointed to
the outer bounds of congressional power, it does not represent a
bright boundary line defining what is local and what is nation-
al." ° Where and if that bright line will emerge is a question
for the future. Lopez simply indicates that although the Com-
merce Clause is a broad grant of power in light of the modern
economy, it is not all-reaching, and Congress must remain mind-
ful of that fact."'
If the Court's intent was more far-reaching, i.e., to revitalize
the federalism doctrine, the cases addressed in the lower courts
during the year-and-a-half since the Lopez decision indicate that
the Court has failed to accomplish its goal."' By relying on a
three-part test derived from the heights of Commerce Clause
breadth1 . (and correspondingly the nadir of constitutional fed-
eralism), the Court has undermined the opinion's pro-federalist
strength. This undermining has in large part left the lower
courts with little choice but to apply the broad precedents with
which they are familiar. Thus, the lower courts have continued
the pre-Lopez breadth of the congressional commerce power. The
Court in Lopez offered no clearly heightened level of scrutiny as
Note. Several articles have discussed the issue in recent years. See Kathleen F.
Brickey, Criminal Mischief" The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995); Robert E. Cowen, Federalization of State Law Questions:
Upheaval Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1371 (1995); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARv. L. REV. 26, 70 n.196 (1994); Leonard I. Garth, Views from the Federal Bench:
Past, Present & Future, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1361 (1995); Rory K. Little, Myths and
Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1995); William P. Marshall, Fed-
eralization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (1995); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147 (1994);
H. Scott Wallace, Compulsive Disorder: Stop Me Before I Federalize Again, PROSECU-
TOR, May-June 1994, at 21.
109. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (stating that findings enable the Court to deter-
mine congressional judgment that was not otherwise apparent and implying that the
judgment exercised regarding the Gun-Free School Zones Act was minimal or ab-
sent); see also id. at 1632 n.4 (discussing the post hoe findings promulgated in a
last-ditch effort to save the statute).
110. See id. at 1633-34.
111. See id.
112. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the precedents relied




an alternative to applying these broad precedents. Instead, the
Court merely observed that some fuzzy area of law making is
beyond the reach of congressional power."4 This situation has
left the lower courts the option of applying clear, familiar tests
of congressional legitimacy or applying a vague remark that
there is some area that is beyond federal power. The evaluation
of the CSRA by the lower federal courts illustrates the lack of
guidance from Lopez and points to the conclusion that Lopez has
not reinvigorated the federalism value on a practical level.
THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT: APPLYING LOPEZ
The Act
The CSRA criminalizes the willful failure to pay child support
in another state."5 Congress passed the CSRA in order to ad-
dress the growing problem of interstate enforcement of child
support awards by punishing certain parents who intentionally
had failed to fulfill their support payment obligations."' Under
the Act, a first offense is punishable by a fine, imprisonment of
up to six months, or both."7. In passing the legislation, Con-
gress intended to add another weapon to the child support en-
forcement arsenal:
Although many of our States have made willful failure to
pay child support a crime, punishable in some States by 10
years in prison, the ability of those States to enforce such
laws outside their borders is hobbled by snarls of redtape and
extradition laws.
Failure to pay child support amounts to a double robbery
that makes the Brinks heist look like petty larceny. First,
more than a million American children are robbed of a cumu-
lative $18 billion in needed financial support. A decent stan-
114. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994). For the relevant text of the CSRA, see supra
note 2.
116. See H.R. REP No. 102-771, at 4 (1992).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(b)(1). It appears, however, that the sentence imposed is
usually far shorter than six months. See Failure To Pay Support Draws Stiff 60-Day
Term, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1996, at B4.
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dard of living is literally stolen from them by the estranged
parent. The obstacles they face to becoming productive adults
increase substantially.11
The CSRA also requires that offenders pay restitution to the
custodial parent in the amount of the total arrearage."9 The
CSRA and the punishments thereunder were designed to fill a
gap in the child support enforcement system that had allowed
parents desiring to evade their child support obligations to do so
successfully by crossing a state line.2 '
The challenges to the CSRA typically assert that child support
does not in itself constitute "commerce"; that the regulated act,
interstate payment of child support, does not substantially affect
interstate commerce; and, further, that the regulation of inter-
state child support payments constitutes neither the regulation




Under the Lopez Commerce Clause analysis, the issue of the
constitutionality of the CSRA has divided lower courts more se-
verely than has the constitutionality of any other challenged
statute. 22 The courts' division illustrates competing interpreta-
118. House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Schumer).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(c).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 5-6.
121. See United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1097-100 (D.R.I. 1996); United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v.
Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817, 819-20 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 940 F.
Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 305-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1034-37 (W.D.N.Y.
1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235-39 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United
States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 834-35 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Sage,
906 F. Supp. 84, 91 (D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101, (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 364-65 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Mussari, 95 F.3d 78; United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (W.D. Va.
1995), vacated for improper venue, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. July 9, 1996); United
States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 999
(10th Cir. 1996).
122. See supra note 96.
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tions of the meaning and scope of Lopez.1" Those courts that
have upheld the CSRA have done so primarily on the basis of
the economic nature of the child support payment and the likeli-
hood that nonpayment will exert substantial economic effects on
interstate commerce.m Those courts that have found the Act
to be unconstitutional have asserted a stronger federalism value
and have concluded that child support is an element of family
law, traditionally a state concern, over which Congress has no
legitimate power."
This section of the Note applies the analytical framework of
Lopez to the CSRA. In instances where the lower federal courts
have addressed specific issues in the analysis, those court deci-
sions will be compared and contrasted with possible competing
interpretations of the Lopez decision. In the final section of the
Note, the lower court interpretations of the Lopez standard as
applied to the CSRA provide a starting point for a discussion of
the steps that the Supreme Court may take in future Commerce
Clause cases if the Court would like to revitalize federalism on a
practical level.
Several issues arose in the Lopez decision's discussion of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act that are applicable to the CSRA.
Three issues are readily apparent: jurisdictional element, find-
ings or legislative history, and the three-pronged analytical
framework.12
Interstate Jurisdictional Element
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the CSRA contains a
jurisdictional element with an interstate nexus.'27 The Act re-
123. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
124. See Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1097-100; Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1083; Sims,
936 F. Supp. at 819-20; Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 914; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 314-
15; Collins, 921 F. Supp. at 1036-37; Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1236-39; Sage, 906 F.
Supp. at 93; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393; Murphy, 8"93 F. Supp. at 616-17; Hamp-
shire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
125. See Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 834-35; United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727,
728-29 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364-65; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp.
at 364-65.
126. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-32 (1995).
127. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (containing no mention of interstate issues), with
18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (requiring the parent and child to live in different states). In sev-
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quires that the noncustodial parent in arrearage must have
failed to pay court-ordered child support for a child living in an-
other state before criminal liability will attach." Under Lopez,
this element may be enough to support a finding that the stat-
ute is constitutional on Commerce Clause grounds because such
an element ensures that the monetary transaction being regulat-
ed, the payment of child support, must cross state boundaries
before the Act is implicated." In effect, the CSRA's jurisdic-
tional element ensures that the federal government regulates
the payment of money that would be traveling interstate if it
were being paid.30 This element limits the regulation so that
it only affects items within Congress's commerce power-those
traveling interstate-and, as a result, narrows the federal
government's grasp to items specifically within its enumerated
powers."' Many lower courts have upheld the statute precisely
on these grounds."3 2
The interstate jurisdictional element, however, differs some-
what from the jurisdictional element described favorably in
Lopez. The element discussed in Lopez required that the regulat-
ed item, in that case a gun, must have traveled interstate before
the crime was committed. 3' Because the purpose of the CSRA
is to punish individuals for the failure to make a specific trans-
action," nothing has moved via interstate commerce. The gov-
eral cases this jurisdictional element has been the basis for the finding that the
CSRA is constitutional. See Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91-92; Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at
392-93; Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616-17; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a).
129. See Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329.
130. Cf id. ("The statute ... only affects willful violations of interstate child sup-
port obligations.").
131. Cf. id. (reasoning that the interstate jurisdictional requirement placed the
CSRA within Congress's constitutional reach).
132. See United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D.R.I. 1996); United
States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91
(D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); Hampshire, 899 F. Supp. at 1339
(D. Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F. 3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
133. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (comparing the Gun-
Free School Zones Act to the statute in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971),
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1202, and holding
that unlike the statute in Bass, the Gun-Free School Zones Act had "no express ju-
risdictional element which might limit its reach . . . to interstate commerce").
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 228. Punishment under the statute accrues when payments
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eminent is stepping in and punishing an individual because
money should have traveled in interstate commerce but did
not."3 5 This distinction may prove to be significant enough to
preclude the CSRA's jurisdictional provision from saving the
statute.36 Viewed in the light that the statute's jurisdictional
element really is looking for the absence of an interstate
transaction, this jurisdictional requirement that the delinquent
parent reside in another state easily is seen as a domiciliary re-
quirement rather than an interstate element.'37 The CSRA re-
ally seeks only separate states of residence for the parent and
child. 3 ' The simple act of living in another state without some
direct interstate transaction may not be enough to satisfy the
interstate jurisdictional requirement as outlined in Lopez. 3 '
One lower court utilized this distinction and determined that the
CSRA's jurisdictional element did not save the statute. 40
Findings and Legislative History
In the area of findings and legislative history, two major simi-
larities exist between the CSRA and the Gun-Free School, Zones
are not made to a child that lives out of state; the only thing that has travelled out
of state is either the noncustodial parent or the child. See id. § 228(a). The CSRA
criminalizes the behavior of failing to pay child support, i.e., the failure to make
payment when one is under a legal duty to do so.
135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
136. No exact analogy exists between criminalizing possession and criminalizing
failure to pay child support. The physical act of possession is much more tangible,
as is the object possessed. Proof can exist that the object travelled through inter-
state commerce, and such proof is a separate consideration from the criminal act of
possession. In the case of failure to make a payment, the criminalized act is the
failure to fulfill the legal duty of paying the support, and the jurisdictional element
attaches to the individual under the duty. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). In other words,
the interstate element attaches to the person who has failed to perform an act, the
performance of which would be an interstate transaction. Because no transaction oc-
curred, it cannot be evaluated separately for proof of an interstate component.
137. The only relevant factors are the states of residence of the child and the non-
custodial parent. See id.
138. See id.
139. Unless the domiciliary/urisdictional component of 18 U.S.C. § 228 is consid-
ered to have the same limiting effect discussed in Lopez it will not meet the re-
quirement. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
140. See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:677
Act. First, as with gun possession statutes,"" Congress has en-
acted statutes related to enforcement of child support payments
in the past.4 Also, neither act mentions "interstate commerce"
in either its legislative history or its findings.'
In the past, Congress has used its spending power to enact
legislation requiring states to institute child support recovery
programs.' Under this arrangement, the federal government
would cut Aid to Families with Dependent Children contribu-
tions45 if the state did not institute the child support collection
program. 4 ' Under the Lopez reasoning, the findings made in
the formulation of the Social Security IV-D Program and its
later amendments would not apply to the CSRA, even though
they address the same general topic of child support collection
and delinquency."4 In Lopez, the Court refused to apply find-
ings from other criminal gun possession statutes grounded on
the Commerce Clause to the Gun-Free School Zones Act because
the older findings did not address the specific issue of gun
141. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
142. See KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW § 5.1 (1982)
(discussing the Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1994), and its
precursors).
143. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-115 (failing to refer to interstate com-
merce); Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Arrearages in Child Support: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S.
Senate on S. 1002, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (ignoring inter-
state commerce); H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 1-8 (1992) (failing to refer to interstate
commerce).
144. REDDEN, supra note 142, § 5.1. At the time of its inception in 1935, Aid to
Dependent Children, later known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
sought to provide financial assistance to the children of widowed, unwed, divorced,
or separated mothers. See Victoria Vasquez, Note, Evaluation of the New York Child
Support Standards Act: Have the Guidelines Really Made a Difference?, 4 J.L. &
POL'Y 279, 282 n.14 (1995).
145. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 651 (stating the purposes for which federal funding will be
available). Seventy-five percent of child support enforcement programs and paternity
establishment programs were federally funded. See Vasquez, supra note 144, at 283
n.16 (citing Michael E. Barber, Update on Title IV-D, 1 AM. J. FAM. L. 383, 383
(1987)). Local jurisdictions received an incentive of 25% of welfare dollars saved as
encouragement for the establishment of child support enforcement programs. See id.
146. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665.
147. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995) (discussing reasons
that past legislative findings cannot support the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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possession on school grounds.' The findings from the earlier
congressional child support enactments fall even further from
the tree in the case of the CSRA because the other child sup-
port-related programs were implemented under the spending
power and focused on promoting intrastate child support collec-
tion. Thus, no need existed to address any type of interstate ef-
fects, 149 nor would relevant findings be pertinent to interstate
child support collection issues. 5 '
The CSRA compares favorably to the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, however, when one examines the findings and legislative
history of the acts themselves. Whereas the legislative history
and findings of the Gun-Free School Zones Act were devoid of
economic data, the history and findings of the CSRA are full of
references to the economic effects of the failure by noncustodial
parents to make their court-ordered child support payments.
151
As a result of these findings and history, it is abundantly clear
that the CSRA had an economic basis.'52 Several lower courts
cited these findings and legislative history in determining that
the CSRA is constitutional under the Lopez analysis."5
Three economic considerations dominated the legislative con-
sideration of the CSRA. First, legislators addressed the issue of
the feminization of poverty." 4 The feminization of poverty has
148. See id.
149. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (lacking any distinction between intrastate and inter-
state issues).
150. The findings that were dismissed in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632, were relevant
to the criminalization of gun possession but not specifically on school grounds. Those
findings nevertheless are connected more closely to the Gun-Free School Zones Act
than are the 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 findings, which related to the need for instituting
a nationwide network of intrastate child support collection programs, connected to
the CSRA.
151. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-2, 8-9 (statements of Reps. Schumer
and Hyde); Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 1-2, 7-10 (statements of Sens. Kohl
and Shelby); H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 5-6 (1992); see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1631-32 (discussing the insufficiency of the Gun-Free School Zones Act's findings).
152. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-2, 8-9 (statements of Reps. Schumer
and Hyde); Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 1-2, 7-10 (statements of Sens. Kohl
and Shelby); H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 5-6.
153. See United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1002-04 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Nichols,
928 F. Supp. 302, 311-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Schumer).
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directly resulted, in most instances, from child-rearing responsi-
bilities in a household headed by a single mother with insuffi-
cient economic resources.155 This economic insufficiency often
arises due to insufficient child support awards or payments. 55
Congress also considered the phenomenon of single mothers be-
ing forced onto the welfare roles as a result of the failure of fa-
thers to pay child support. 57 Finally, throughout the discus-
sions of the CSRA, Congress considered the economic effects of
failure to pay child support on the children themselves.'58 The
scope of the economic effects on children was considered sepa-
rately from the economic effects on their mothers. Whereas ma-
ternal effects included issues such as work force participation
and child-care costs,'59 the discussed effects on children were
more likely to be the result of inadequate access to goods or
services, such as food and clothing which could have been pur-
chased with the proceeds of the child support payments."6 Also
considered as part of the economic effects on children were the
155. See TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL
DILEMMAS 1-3 (1986); Archibald Stuart, Rescuing Children: Reforms in the Child
Support Payment System, SOC. SERV. REV., June 1986, at 201; Jay D. Teachman,
Who Pays? Receipt of Child Support in the United States, 53 J. OF MARRIAGE &
FAM., 759, 759 (1991); see also Ann Nichols-Casebolt, The Economic Impact of Child
Support Reform on the Poverty Status of Custodial and Noncustodial Families, 48 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM., 875, 875 (1986) (addressing the economic impact of insufficient
child support payments); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The
Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America,
reprinted in FREDERICA LOMBARD, READINGS IN FAMILY LAW: DIVORCE AND ITS CON-
SEQUENCES 83-96 (1990) (discussing the economic effects that divorce has on women).
156. See ARENDELL, supra note 155, at 76-79; Nichols-Casebolt, supra note 155, at
875; Stuart, supra note 155, at 201-02; Jay D. Teachman, Contributions to Children
by Divorced Fathers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 358, 358 (1991).
157. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Schumer); Senate
Hearing, supra note 143, at 1-2, 7 (statements of Sens. Kohl and Shelby); see also,
Philip K. Robins, Child Support, Welfare Dependency and Poverty, AM. ECON. REV.,
Sept. 1986, at 768-78 (studying and analyzing the economic effects of nonreceipt of
child support).
158. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 6, 9 (statement of Rep. Hyde); Senate
Hearing, supra note 143, at 2-4 (statements of Sens. Kohl and Biden); H.R. REP. No.
102-771, at 5-6 (1992).
159. See John W. Graham & Andrea H. Beller, The Effect of Child Support Pay-
ments on the Labor Supply of Female Family Heads: An Econometric Analysis, 24 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 664, 682 (1989).
160. See Gladys Kessler, Crisis in Child Support, TRIAL, Dec. 1984, at 30; see also
CAROLE A. CHAMBERS, CHILD SUPPORT 37-75 (1991) (listing child-related expenses).
[Vol. 38:677708
LOPEZ: PRACTICAL WHIMPER?
long-term effects that result from living in poverty, such as di-
minished educational attainment. 6'
Congress backed the CSRA with findings and a legislative
history based on the economic effects of the proposed legislation.
Such findings and history were wholly lacking in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act.'62 The CSRA's history did not make clear,
however, that these effects had an interstate component." At
this point in the analysis, it becomes important to consider
whether the rational basis test still applies. If so, there seems to
be a clear inference that CSRA's findings and legislative history
indicate the congressional belief that instances of noncustodial
parents failing to pay child support for a child who resides in
another state, when aggregated, substantially impact the nation-
al economy."M Under rational basis review, such an inference
should be a sufficient basis upon which a court could uphold the
statute.
65
Of course, the findings do not state directly that the cumula-
tive failures of noncustodial parents to pay child support for chil-
dren residing out of state substantially affect interstate com-
merce, leaving room to make an alternative interpretation. 66
Under Lopez, it would appear that the Court might look to the
actual evils that Congress sought to remedy through the enact-
ment of the CSRA and evaluate their effects on interstate com-
161. Cf House Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Schumer) (noting
that the money "freed-up" if deadbeats would pay child support could go toward pro-
grams such as Head Start).
162. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-32 (1995). But see Maloney,
supra note 33, at 1825-26 (noting that the legislative history of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act is not devoid of evidence that the Commerce Clause was considered).
163. The CSRA's legislative history lacks any specific reference to interstate com-
merce. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-115; Senate Hearing, supra note 143,
at 1-121; H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 1-8 (1992). Congress may have assumed that the
frequently mentioned interstate jurisdictional element was sufficient. See House Hear-
ing, supra, at 1-115; Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 1-121; H.R. REP. No. 102-
771, at 1-8.
164. See Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 8-9 (Statement of Sen. Shelby).
165. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 99, at 16 (illustrating the Supreme
Court's willingness to find a rational basis).
166. For example, one might argue that Congress's primary interest in passing the
CSRA was political expedience--exacting punishment on deadbeat dads for easy po-
litical gain-and that the bill's effects on the national economy were irrelevant dur-
ing consideration and passage of the CSRA.
1997] 709
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
merce under a form of intermediate scrutiny analysis. 67
Three-pronged Analysis
Channels or Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce"
In determining the constitutionality of the CRSA under Lopez,
only one district court explicitly determined that the CSRA regu-
lated the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In United
States v. Lewis,'69 the court stated: "The CSRA only applies
where there is a court order requiring the transfer of money
across state lines to fulfill a child support obligation. Thus, the
CSRA clearly involves channels of interstate commerce and is a
permissible use of Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause."7' In contrast, one of the district courts finding, that
the CSRA was an unconstitutional overextension of congressional
power found the assertion that the CSRA was a regulation of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce to be untenable: "[No
one contends, as they surely could not, that the CSRA somehow is
an exercise of Congressional power under the second category,
i.e. the instrumentalities of interstate commerce .... "1
These courts differ in their interpretation of the scope of inter-
state commercial instrumentalities. The view espoused in Lewis
reflects a belief that Congress is able to pass legislation promot-
ing the use of interstate channels without directly regulating
them. The Mussari view is a narrower construction and seeks
the direct regulation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce
167. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (considering first the lack of findings or legis-
lative history for the Gun-Free School Zones Act, then proceeding to look at the
actual effects on interstate commerce proffered by the government).
168. Under Lopez, channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce technically
are separate parts of the three-part analysis of permissible, congressional, commerce-
based legislation, however, the lower courts addressing the issues tend to use the
language interchangeably to identify the telephone, mail, and electronic transfers
that would occur as a result of child support payments. Because the cases have not
clearly distinguished between channels and instrumentalities, this section of the Note
uses the terms interchangeably.
169. 936 F. Supp. 1093 (D.R.I. 1996).
170. Id. at 1097-98.
171. United States v. Mussari, 912 F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (D. Ariz. 1995), reu'd, 95
F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). In its reversal of the district court, the
Ninth Circuit did not address the "instrumentality of interstate commerce" issue.
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in order for a legislative enactment to fit under the 'instrumen-
talities" category of the Lopez analysis.
Lopez, because it applied only the substantial effects test, does
not guide the lower courts as to the proper scope of Congress's
ability to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
173
Persons or Things in Interstate Commerce
Lower courts are also split on the issue of whether the CSRA
regulates a person or thing in interstate commerce. On one hand,
courts have noted that the cash payment required under the Act
would be a thing moving in interstate commerce if it were
paid.74 Therefore, those courts have considered nonpayment of
court-ordered child support to be an "impediment" to interstate
commerce. 75 Considering the payment in this manner, these
courts have upheld the CSRA under the Lopez analysis. 76
On the other hand, another court considering the identical
issue has reached the opposite conclusion, noting that regulating
the nontransfer of funds across state lines means that no good or
person in interstate commerce exists for Congress to regu-
late.177 Because no payment or person is traveling in interstate
commerce when the CSRA is applied, this line of reasoning con-
cludes that the "persons or things in interstate commerce" prong
of the Lopez analysis'78 does not save the statute from a find-
ing of unconstitutionality" 9
Actual Substantial Effects
Through this intermediate-type scrutiny, the differences be-
tween the CSRA and the Gun-Free School Zones Act become
172. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
173. See id at 1631-32.
174. See United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1996); Sage v. United States, 92 F.3d
101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996).
175. See Mussari, 95 F.3d at 790.
176. See id.; Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1002; Sage, 92 F.3d at 107.
177. See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 842-43 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
178. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).
179. See Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842-43.
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clearer. Throughout its analysis of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, the Court continually emphasized that the prohibition on
carrying guns within 1000 feet of a school had no effect on com-
merce or any sort of economic enterprise. 8 ' The government
could only offer very attenuated economic effects resulting from
the carriage of guns in a school zone.' Child support pay-
ments, in contrast, may themselves qualify as commerce.
18 2
Further, the enormous monetary transfers that comprise child
support payments exert a substantial impact on the economy."
Interstate Child Support Payments as Commerce
Interstate child support payments can qualify as a form of
interstate commerce.' Such payments comprise the transfer
of large sums of money over state lines." Further, delinquent
child support payments can be considered debt, such that efforts
to collect interstate delinquent payments across state lines qual-
ify as interstate debt collection.'86 The Supreme Court, in Unit-
ed States v. Shubert,"s7 defined commerce as "a 'continuous and
indivisible stream of intercourse among the states' involving the
transmission of large sums of money and communication by
mail, telephone and telegraph. " " Typically, debt collection in-
180. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-34.
181. See id. at 1632.
182. See infra notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text (calculating the substantial pro-
portion of delinquent child support payments attributable to interstate enforcement
difficulties); see also CHILD SUPPORT 1991, supra note 3 (analyzing child support
obligations in 1991 statistically and indicating substantial dollar values).
184. "There is no authority for the proposition that Congress's power extends only
to the regulation of commercial entities. To the contrary, courts have upheld numer-
ous statutes which regulate private conduct that affects commercial entities or com-
mercial activity." United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 684 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 46 (1996).
185. See Irwin Garfinkel, The Child Support Revolution, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 81
(1994) (describing child support as a cash transfer).
186. See Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit
for Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POLY 321, 334-35 (1994) (referring to
delinquent child support obligations as debts).
187. 348 U.S. 222, 226 (1955).
188. Id. at 226 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 541 (194)); accord United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) ("iTihe act of collecting an obligation, though dealing with an intangible,
[Vol. 38:677712
LOPEZ: PRACTICAL WHIMPER?
volves such a process."'
As of spring 1992, there were 11.5 million single-parent
households of which 6.2 million were owed child support.9 ' Of
the single-parent households, almost 4 million included children
whose noncustodial parent resided in a different state.' 91 The
average annual child support received in single-parent house-
holds was approximately $2652 in 1991.192 The aggregate child
support payment due to all such households was $17.7 billion, of
which $11.9 billion was received, leaving a payment gap in 1991
alone of $5.8 billion'.193 About thirty-five percent of delinquent
payments are attributable to noncustodial parents who live out
of state. 19 In 1991, therefore, interstate deficiencies in pay-
ment totaled approximately $2.0 billion.'95 If one assumes that
each single parent affected by an interstate delinquency is owed
the average award of $2652, then approximately 754,148 fami-
lies must attempt to collect their interstate debts.'96 It is not
difficult to imagine that such efforts would generate the consis-
tent interstate phone and mail contact envisioned in
Shubert.19
7
These statistics present only a snapshot of interstate child
support collection because they represent statistics for only one
year.98 Each delinquent parent conceivably could fail to pay
court-ordered child support for eighteen or more years.'99 From
these statistics, one can conclude that interstate child support
collection efforts for delinquent payments, which result in large
does amount to commerce.").
189. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(o) (1994)
(regulating the use of phone and mail in pursuit of collecting past-due debts).
190. See CHILD SUPPORT 1991, supra note 3, at 7.
191. See id. at 8.
192. See id. at 2 (averaging the mean receipts of child support for custodial moth-
ers and custodial fathers).
193. See id.
194. See Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 1 (statement of Sen. Kohl).
195. Two billion is 35% of 5.8 billion.
196. This figure is the result of dividing 2.0 billion by 2652.
197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
198. See CHILD SUPPORT 1991, supra note 3, at 1.
199. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Learning Years: A Review of the Changing Legal
World of Adolescence, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1983) (book review) (discussing
the possible ages at which child support no longer is available).
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amounts of money crossing state borders, constitute a form of
interstate commerce that the CSRA is designed to expedite
through the use of a criminal sanction for nonpayment. °"
In addition, one district court held that child support can be
considered to be interstate commerce under a contract theo-
ry.2°' That court found that an agreement to pay child support
was contractual in nature,22 and that due to the mobile nature
of American society, it was foreseeable that the agreement
would become an interstate matter."' The court reasoned that
contracts with interstate application long have been considered
to be part of interstate commerce.0 4 Therefore, because the
child support contract was itself interstate commerce, the Court
upheld the CSRA under this reasoning.
Direct Effects of Delinquent Child Support Payments on
Interstate Commerce
Narrower definitions of commerce would exclude child support
payments.0 5 Such definitions change the analysis under Lopez.
If collection of delinquent child support payments is not com-
merce, then the constitutionality of the Act turns on whether
Congress is regulating an activity that substantially affects in-
terstate commerce when viewed in the aggregate.0 6 So, the fo-
cus of the analysis shifts from the activity itself to its commer-
cial effects.
In passing the CSRA, Congress was regulating interstate child
200. The systematic attempts by over 700,000 families to collect $2 billion in un-
paid support necessarily would yield the constant telephone and mail discourse that
the Court described as "commerce" in United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226
(1955). See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shubert.
201. See United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1036.
204. See id. at 1035-36 (citing Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S.
282, 292 (1921)).
205. The cases holding the CSRA to be unconstitutional have stated that child
support does not constitute commerce. See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727
(W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd,
95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz.
1995), rev'd sub nom. Mussari, 95 F.3d. 787.
206. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).
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support delinquencies."' Such delinquencies constituted $2 bil-
lion in 1991.08 As a direct effect of this delinquency, $2 billion is
not moving over state boundaries."' That money is spent in the
home state of the noncustodial parent rather than in the home
state of the custodial parent,210 and therefore is distributed dif-
ferently among products markets.' The money is being spent
on items of importance to the noncustodial parent rather than on
items of importance to the custodial parent.2" These results di-
rectly affect commercial markets.213 Because a large amount of
money is diverted from one use to another in the economic mar-
ketplace, child support delinquency affects interstate com-
merce." 4 The question then becomes whether $2 billion per year
is considered substantial. Many courts have held that it is.215
207. The CSRA's legislative history states clearly that one of the purposes of the
Act is to encourage payments of child support for children who live in a separate
state from their noncustodial parents. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 6 (state-
ment of Rep. Hyde); Senate Hearing, supra note 143, at 2 (statement of Sen Kohl);
H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 4 (1992).
208. For an explanation of the $2 billion figure, see supra note 195.
209. See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 90 (D. Conn. 1995), af/'d, 92 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The non-custodial parent reaps an economic gain each time a
support payment is withheld, while the offspring suffers an economic loss.").
210. See id. ("[Tihe non-payment of the 'past due support obligation' will reduce the
child's consumption of goods in interstate commerce.").
211. See id. ("A shift in interstate market demand occasioned by non-payment
would cause businesses to ship their goods to different states to accommodate this
shift.").
212. See id. at 91-92.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 92.
215. See United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (D.R.I. 1996); United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("That billions of dol-
lars in child support goes unpaid annually is evidence both that the activity is eco-
nomic in nature and that the effect of not paying child support is substantial.");
United States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817, 819-20 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v.
Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("ITlhe non-payment of child support
creates an economic problem on a national scale."); United States v. Nichols, 928 F.
Supp. 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Tlhe payment of child support is an economic ac-
tivity which[,] ... viewed in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 91 (D. Conn. 1995), afld, 92
F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The activity regulated in this case has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce in part because states have been unable to enforce their own
support orders through interstate enforcement efforts."); id. ("[T]he statistics and leg-
islative judgment provided in the CSRA's legislative history provide support for this
court's conclusion that Congress acted to control a national problem with substantial
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Indirect Effects of Delinquent Child Support Payments on
Interstate Commerce
Indirect effects of interstate child support delinquencies are
numerous but harder to quantify. Mothers, for example, are
pushed into poverty because they do not receive adequate child
support.216 Some of these women land on the welfare rolls; oth-
ers do not.217 Those that are on welfare rolls receive their child
support from taxpayers.21s Receipt of adequate child support (in
contrast to its nonreceipt) also affects the economic well-being of
single mothers; there is positive correlation between receipt of
child support and female participation in the labor force.219
Children also are affected by child support delinquencies. Un-
met child support obligations yield greater numbers of children
growing up in poverty.22 ' Children who grow up in poverty per-
form less well in school, have lower self-esteem, and tend to con-
tribute to a cycle of poverty.2 ' These effects are more direct
and economically oriented than the effects that failed to save the
Gun-Free School Zones Act.222 Lower courts have based their
holdings that the CSRA is constitutional on these effects on
mothers and children.2"
effects on interstate commerce.").
216. See H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 5 (1992).
217. See Robins, supra note 157, at 769; see also CHILD SUPPORT 1991, supra note
3 (breaking down statistically the percentages of single parent households that fell
below the poverty line in 1991).
218. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Schumer); Senate
Hearing, supra note 143, at 7 (statement of Sen. Shelby).
219. See Graham & Beller, supra note 159, at 669.
220. See H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 5.
221. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Schumer);
Teachman, supra note 156, at 358-71.
222. Cf. United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1995) (discussing
child support payments as commerce and comparing those payments to the posses-
sion of a handgun in a school zone), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
223. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91
(relying on a legislative recitation of similar effects for its determinaton that such
effects are substantial).
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Delinquent Child Support Payments: A Local or National
Issue?
One final consideration must be addressed before the Lopez
analysis can be put to rest; namely, whether upholding the
CSRA would represent an expansion of the national government
into what should be a "truly local" realm. 4 Family law, which
encompasses child support issues, is generally considered to be
an area of state sovereignty.' In light of the traditional view
of family law, the CSRA, which regulates child support enforce-
ment, can be viewed as an intrusion into state sovereignty. 6
The real question, though, is whether it is an unjust intrusion,
i.e., one beyond Congress's power.227 Lopez reiterated that
whatever exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce is
within the realm of the commerce power.' The majority of
lower courts considering the issue have held that the CSRA is
224. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
225. The actual adjudication of a child support order or a conflict relating to child
custody is considered to be local as indicated by its exclusion from federal diversity
jurisdiction under an abstention doctrine known as the Domestic Relations Exception.
See Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction:
Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1995).
This exception first appeared in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858) and
is based on the theory that regulation of family obligations and rights falls within
the sphere of state sovereignty. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821-22 (1995) (citing In re Burus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890)). Although beyond the scope of this Note, the propriety and scope of the Do-
mestic Relations Exception both are open to scholarly debate. See Naomi R. Calm,
Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1087-94
(1994) (arguing that none of the rationales provided for continuing to allow the ex-
ception are satisfactory); Stein, supra, at 679-80. The criminal nature of the CSRA,
however, brings it within the jurisdiction of federal courts despite of the exception.
See United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235-36 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (discussing
the applicability of the Domestic Relations Exception to the CSRA and finding it
inapposite).
226. In fact, the cases that have held the CSRA to be unconstitutional have fo-
cused on the statute as an unnecessary intrusion into state prerogatives by the fed-
eral government in violation of principles of federalism and comity. See United
States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 728 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp 360, 363 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Mussari,
95 F.3d 787.
227. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
228. See id. at 1629-34.
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not an example of Congress overstepping its bounds and pre-
empting an area of state sovereignty having no effect on inter-
state commerce.2" In this case, Congress has decided to legis-
late on only one discrete, interstate portion of a much larger
child support collection problem."0 The portion that Congress
has decided to control is the interstate portion, which, according
to the lower courts, falls within an area of federal power by vir-
tue of the Commerce Clause."1 Thus, the majority of court de-
cisions have held that Congress has stayed within its Commerce
Clause boundaries with the CSRA.
Those courts that have held the CSRA to be unconstitutional
have relied in large part on Lopez's admonition that a distinction
exists between the "truly local" and the "truly national" and that
such a distinction must be maintained to protect federalism. 2
Child support, according to these courts, is a traditional area of
state sovereignty beyond the scope of federal regulation.'
Though the cases holding the CSRA to be unconstitutional have
applied the three-pronged Lopez analysis, their holdings are
based on a more expansive evaluation of the commerce power,
one that steps beyond the literal application of Lopez's three-
pronged test and accounts directly for the intrusiveness of the
229. See United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D.R.I. 1996); United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v.
Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F.
Supp. 1028, 1036 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 915
(E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Okla. 1996);
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1235; United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 91 (D. Conn.
1995), aft'd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389,
393 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va.
1995), vacated for improper venue, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996); United States
v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D. Kan. 1995), afl'd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.
1996).
230. See House Hearing, supra note 5, at 11 (statement of Rep. Hyde). For a full
statistical analysis of child support issues for the year 1991, see CHILD SUPPORT
1991, supra note 3.
231. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
232. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
233. See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United
States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 368-69 (D. Ariz. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Mussari, 95 F.3d 787.
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legislation on state prerogatives.'
CONCLUSION: USING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM LOWER
COURT ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CSRA
Lower courts' treatment of the constitutionality of the CSRA
directs us to the central, practical question raised by Lopez:
What does it mean that the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
under the Commerce Clause for the first time in over fifty years?
At this point, the answer is unsatisfactory and unclear: "Lopez
means something, maybe."
Lopez has fueled a tremendous resurgence in Commerce
Clause-based challenges to federal legislation. s5 The reinvigo-
ration of what once was considered to be a virtually dead area of
constitutional jurisprudence has swamped the courts with nu-
merous challenges, primarily to criminal statutes. Thus far, the
massive influx of challenges has proceeded through the circuit
courts of appeals and has yielded little change in the lower
courts' jurisprudential vision of the Commerce Clause." Stat-
utes, for the most part, have been upheld uniformly as constitu-
tional exercises of congressional commerce power." Though
the question of federalism's demarcation lines has been raised
on numerous occasions, those lines have not shifted in response
to Lopez.
One can point to a number of factors to explain this phenome-
non. Some are measures of the imprecise language and vagaries
of the Lopez decision itself. Others are more fundamental ques-
tions of constitutional structure and values. If the Supreme
Court's goal in handing down Lopez was to reinvigorate feder-
alism, and not merely to spawn a wave of fruitless constitutional
litigation, then the Court needs to address both the technical
and theoretical elements of the inquiry in a future case.
234. "Legal and economic arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, a statute
which sounds, walks, and looks like a duck must be a duck statute. The CSRA...
sounds, walks, and looks like a domestic relations statute and aims the central gov-
ernment down a slippery slope where it should not be." Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730
(citations omitted).
235. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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The technical questions left in the wake of Lopez relate to
standards of review for Commerce Clause challenges. The Court
needs to clarify whether a rational basis test still applies to
Commerce Clause challenges. If the Court intends that a
nondeferential standard of review now apply, it should stop us-
ing the appellation "rational basis" when describing the test.
Calling the test "intermediate scrutiny" would enable the lower
courts to quickly identify that the old precedents, though relied
upon to formulate the Lopez test, are to be applied with new
vigor.
Similarly, the Court also needs to address the role of congres-
sional decision making, specifically regarding legislative findings
and history. Appropriate findings that clearly outline the inter-
state nexus of particular legislation made by Congress during
consideration and debate of legislation may yield deferential re-
view. If the Court's intention in Lopez was to insist on clear leg-
islative reasoning for Congress's broad use of its commerce pow-
er, the imposition of a deferential standard of review when ade-
quate findings are present would meet that goal. Of course,
some debate remains over whether congressional findings alone
are enough to prevent overreaching. If Lopez was meant to rein-
vigorate federalism as a constitutional value, then perhaps the
same intermediate standard of review should apply regardless of
congressional findings. The structural issue of the federalism
debate (whether Congress has stepped over the line of federal
authority in enacting legislation) is not squarely addressed by
insistence on proper congressional findings.
In the final analysis, technical issues related to the standard
of review are not the most important questions that must be
clarified by the Court if it chooses to revisit Lopez. Federalism's
real question-how to balance federal and state power-is not
straightforwardly addressed by the substantial effects test stat-
ed in Lopez. To promote federalism, the Court should transform
Commerce Cause inquiry into a balancing test. Such a test
would evaluate congressional legislation for its intrusiveness
into areas of state sovereignty. The appropriate inquiry should
be whether the federal interest is strong enough to displace
state sovereignty in the regulated area. The substantial effects
test, when applied as a quantitative analysis of the economic
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impact of legislation, does not adequately address the core issue
of federalism: When has federal power gone too far?
If the Supreme Court wants to bolster federalism, the sub-
stantial effects test should be enhanced to include an explicit
consideration of the balance of state and federal power. As a
threshold matter, the Court would inquire into the substantial
effects the legislation has on the national economy by applying
the current substantial effects test. If the legislation has no such
effects, then it should fail as falling outside of the Commerce
Clause's legislative parameters. If substantial effects exist, the
analysis must proceed to address the heart of the federalism
question-power. The Court should ask an additional question:
Is the federal interest in regulating an issue strong enough to
outweigh state sovereignty interests?
The addition of this second balancing factor to the substantial
effects test outlined in Lopez gives content to the assertion that
there are some areas that are "truly local" and therefore beyond
congressional power. This additional inquiry would enable lower
courts to evaluate more strenuously congressional enactments
for intrusion into state prerogatives. With the imposition of a
new balancing test, Lopez's theoretical and practical implications
would be more closely aligned, transforming it from its current
status of theoretical bang and practical whimper into an effec-
tive shift in jurisprudential vision.
Sara L. Gottovi
1997]
